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AID AGAINST TERRORISM? 
BJØRN MØLLER, GUEST LECTURER, DIR 
 
The rationales and objectives for development aid (ODA: official development assistance) have 
evolved over time—from a rather simplistic goal of economic growth, via an explicit focus on poverty 
reduction to also encompassing, e.g., environmental sustainability and good governance (Degnbol-
Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen 1999, pp. 28-47). More recently security considerations have 
appeared as new (or at least supplementary) goal of ODA and as a possible criterion for right-sizing 
and allocating ODA. It is in this connection that the post-September 11 discussion should be seen 
about whether to also make counter-terrorism a criterion.  
 
1 ODA AND SECURITY 
Even before the debate about linking aid to security took off a debate had taken place about the very 
meaning of the concept of security (Buzan 1991; Buzan & al. 1998; Møller 2001). This is not the place 
for an elaboration on this  debate. Suffice it to say that it has been suggested to add other “referent 
objects” of security (i.e. entities whose security may be at stake) to that of the state, either societal 
groups such as nations or ethnic groups or even individuals. Depending on the referent object, 
different values may be threatened and therefore in need of protection, as set out in Table 1.  
  
Table 1: Expanded concepts of security 
Label Whose security? Values at risk Potential threats 
National 
Security 
The State Sovereignty 
Territorial integrity 
Other states 
Societal 
Security 
Nations 
Societal groups 
National cohesion  
Identity 
Migrants 
Alien cultures  
Human 
Security 
Individuals 
Humankind 
Survival 
Qualilty of life 
Own state 
Globalisation 
Terrorism 
 
Such expansion has obvious implications for the possible linkage between aid and security, where the 
focus has been on security in an expanded sense. An even more general question is, however, whose 
national, societal or human security might be enhanced through the allocation of aid—that of the 
donors (i.e. “ours”) or that of the recipients, i.e. “theirs”? 
 
1.1 ODA and our security 
Whether aid might contribute to solving our security problems by making threats disappear depends, 
of course, on an assessment of the kind of security threats countries like Denmark may be facing from 
potential aid recipients, i.e. the Third World. 
Even though some have talked about military threats to Europe, including Denmark, from Third World 
countries, e.g. in the form of ballistic missiles and/or weapons of mass destruction (Nolan 1991), such 
alleged threats may safely be dismissed as largely fictitious. Europe’s and NATO’s military 
superiority is simply so overwhelming (see Fig. 1) that it takes more than simple paranoia to take 
military threats from “South” against “North” seriously. 
 
Fig 1: Global Military Expenditures 2001 
 (SIPRI Yearbook 2002 , pp. 266-267) 
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The situation may be somewhat different with regard to non-military threats to our national identity, 
i.e. our “societal security” (Wæver & al. 1993). In principle this might be endangered by massive 
flows of immigrants and/or refugees from the Third World, as alleged by certain rights-wing groups in 
European countries, including Denmark. ODA might be instrumentalised to contribute to solving this 
alleged security problem, as has been suggested in the recent debate about using ODA resources to 
assist refugees in their immediate neighbourhoods in order to guard against them coming to our part of 
the world (Møller 2002). Before accepting this argument at face value one should, however, realise 
that by far the majority of the world’s refugees already remain in neighbouring countries, i.e. in the 
Third World—and realise how easily this argument  may be combined with xenophobia and racism. 
´ As we shall se below, terrorism originating in the Third World may, of course, threaten the 
human (i.e. individual) security of Danes and other people of the North (Commission on Human 
Security 2003; Thomas & Wilkin, eds. 1999) as might, in principle, crime and/or contagious diseases 
stemming from the developing countries. On the other hand, the real risk which these problems may 
constitute (e.g. measured in fatalities) is very low compared to other risks which we willingly take. 
Nevertheless, it might make some sense to use ODA to help solving these problems, e.g. through 
public health programmes and crime prevention schemes in the Third World with a view  to 
preventing these problems from reaching our part of the world. 
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 Regardless of the questionable reality and severity of these potential security problems there is 
something to be said both for and against including them as criteria for the allocation of ODA. In 
favour of so doing might speak the hope that cutbacks of ODA might be averted if a convincing case 
could be made that giving aid is in our own best interest, i.e. that it could enhance our security. 
Whoever is (as the present author) in favour of an expansion of development aid might therefore be 
tempted to refer to selfish security interests as an argument, regardless of the logical and empirical 
case for doing so.  
 Against doing so speaks the risk of a backlash. If security considerations are alowed to play a 
decisive role in the “rightsizing” of ODA, the latter becomes vulnerable to any reevaluation of the 
threats. Should the fear of security threats (rightly) be assessed as minor and/or declining it would 
seem obvious to reduce the volume of ODA, just as it would be logical to reduce it if other and more 
serious threats should appear on the horison, for the countering of which ODA would be obviously 
useless. 
 One might further fear a schewing of ODA distrubution towards our own immediate 
neighbourhood if security considerations become decisive. Presumably countries in our 
neighbourhood will (ceteris paribus) be regarded as the most likely sources of threat and hence be 
eligible for the lion’s share of ODA, regardless of the actual needs of these recipients in comparison 
with others.  Or one might decide to make countries that would otherwise not qualify as ODA 
recipients eligible for it as a contribution to their democratisation, hence presumably as a contribution 
to our security—as recently suggested by the Danish government (Udenrigsministeriet 2003, s. 8). 
Countries such as Mozambique thus risk receiving a declining share, as it strains the imagination to 
envision threats against Danish security emanating from Southern Africa. Finally, the ethics in 
allowing selfish security interests to determine aid is questionable. If this form of aid is actually 
granted primarily as a contribution to Danish security, the means for it should rightly be taken from 
the defence rather than from the aid budget.. 
 All considered the arguments against allowing our own security concerns to play a decisive 
role in determing the size and distribution of aid seem to outweigh those in favour—which does not, 
however, mean that it does not make good sense to include them as supplementary criteria. The case is 
rather different if we take the security needs of potential recipients of aid as our analytical point of 
departure. 
  
1.2 ODA and their security  
If we uphold the principle that aid is granted with a view to helping peoples of the Third World, it 
makes perfect sense to also include the security requirements of these populations in our 
considerations as to who should receive how much aid and in what form. 
 There is an intrinsic link between development and security, even though it is more complex 
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that one might assume. If we commence with the national (i.e. state) security of Third World 
countries, a few authors have argued that the military expenditures required for this security may play 
a positive role in furthering economic development (Benoit 1973). However, today there is near 
unanimity that military expenditures come at the expense of economic and social development (Ball 
1988; Brauer & Dunne, red. 2003). 
 On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that many countries in the developing world have 
quite genuine security problems, e.g. in the form of unpleasant neighbours, which may make military 
expenditures indispensable, their negative impact on development notwithstanding. In the best of cases 
an adequate defensive capability may contribute to maintaining a regional balance of power, thereby 
preventing wars with all their negative implications for economic and social development. Even in the 
worst case, defence expenditures may help prevent such defeat and subsequent occupation  as may 
also cost dearly. Even though one might thus justify actual military assistance as development aid, the 
opposite logic seems to hold sway, i.e. that otherwise ODA-eligible countries may forefeit their 
“right” to ODA if their military expenditures are judged to be excessive. Hence, recipient countries 
may be forced to “pay” for their development with a deterioration of their national security. 
 As far as societal security is converned, national identities in many Third World countries are 
very much threatened by refugee flows of entirely different proportion than what Europe has 
experienced. In the year 2001 Sudan was, for instance, “host” to no less than 324,000 refugees from 
Eritrea, while Ethiopia had to host 67,000 refugees from Somalia and 90,000 from Sudan (UNHCR 
2001, pp. 82-94), which may well any “delicate balances” between ethnic groups in the host countries 
and exacerbate inter-ethnic resentments, hatreds and rivalries. Even though some of the refugee flows 
are surely due to either poverty pure and simple or to natural disasters, many also flee from wars and 
civil wars—which means that the societal secuirity of Sudan and Ethiopia might be enhanced by 
preventing or mitigating armed conflicts in their respective neighbouring countries. 
 Even more serious than national and societal security, however,  is the state of human security 
in the Third World, i.e. the threats to  the survival and quality of life of its populations. Not only is 
human security threatened indirectly by refugee flows which may deprive the already under-nurished 
local population of food, or by wars which may lead to hostile occupation. It is also threatened directly 
by the lack of development. In the terminology of the Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung the 
peoples of the Third Wolds are victims of “structural violence” which may be defined as “relative 
deprivation”, i.e. as having at one’s disposal less that would be possible (Galtung 1975). Hence human 
security may be almost synonymous with an absence of structural violence, i.e. with economic and 
social development (Møller 2001). Besides this structural violence, moreover, life in the Third World 
tends also to be replete with direct violence, e.g. in  the form of armed conflicts or violent crime. 
Besides constituting a major problem in its own right, such violence also tends to affect economic 
development negatively, e.g. as crops are destroyed by passing warlords or as those peasant and 
farmworkers who should secure the harvests are forced to flee the struggle. 
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 It therefore makes perfect sense to combine development aid with efforts to prevent, manage 
or resolve such conflicts, as Danida did in 2000 (Udenrigsministeriet 2000). Conflict prevention 
and/or resolution is simply a logical companion of poverty relief and good governance, as violent 
conflicts have a clear propensity to exacerbate poverty and make bad governance even worse. The 
reverse logic also applies, as poverty relief and the furthering of good governance, democracy and 
human rights are quite effective means of conflict prevention. It thus makes sense to devote some 
ODA resources to, for instance, local, national or regional training programmes in conflict prevention, 
management and resolution, as has happened in Southern Africa and elsewhere. As soon as we move 
from “soft” (i.e. non-military) security to “hard” security, including the use of military instruments, 
however, some “taboos” have to be broken and donor countries may find themselves facing some 
uncomfortable dilemmas. 
 
• Should we, e.g., support the creation of a military capacity for peacekeeping operations (as 
Denmark has done in Africa), thus running the risk that this capacity may be abused for less 
peaceful purposes? 
• Should we seek to prevent a re-ignition of a conflict just resolved  (as in Angola) by granting 
support to the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants (Kingma, red. 2000), thus 
priviliging them over the “real civilians” who have usually been the innocent victims of the 
conflict? 
• Should ODA funds be made available for the purchase of weapons for destruction—which 
may well be the best way to solve the problem of an excessive proliferation of small arms in 
the aftermath of an armed conflict (Boutwell & al., eds., 1995; Dhanapala & al., eds. 1999)—
if  this entails the risk that weapons may be smuggled in from neighbouring countries with a 
view to being sold? 
• Should we perhaps even use ODA funds to support the military defence of recipient countries, 
e.g. with a view to such strengthened border defences as might help prevent conflicts from 
spreading—but with the risk that the weapons supplied may also be used for attack or for the 
repression of the population by the incumbent regime? 
 
There is thus a significant risk that donor countries may not be able to unhold their policy of “clean 
hands”, but that they may end up with “blood on their hands”, even when guided by the best of 
intentions. On the other hand, quite a strong case can be made to the effect that not doing anything 
may be the worst of all alternative courses of action.   
 
2 TERRORISM AND DEVELOPMENS AID 
It should come as no surprise that the questions raised by terrorism resemble those related to security 
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and conflict prevention, as terror is simply one among several ways in which a conflict can be fought 
out (Prins 2002, pp. 63-94). Hence, terror prevention and counter-terrrism are merely subcategories of 
conflict prevention and management. Seen in this light it appears logical to incorporate considerations 
about terrorism in the goals and strategies for development aid, as it happened with Danida’s 2002 
revision of its development policy (Udenrigsministeriet 2002). There are, however, many pitfalls in 
this approach and a serious risk of schewing ODA in an undesirable direction. 
 As with regard to security and conflict it makes sense to distinguish here between “terror 
against us” and “terror against them”, even though this comparison inevitably makes the former pale 
considerably. There is simply a vast gap between the around three thousand victims of the 11 
September attacks and the estimated around three million victims of the civil war in the DR Congo 
since 1998 (IRC 2003), which may also deserve the label “terror”. Whether to call it so depends, of 
course, on the definition of terrorism. 
 Unfortunately, no autoritative definition of the term exists, but most suggested definitions 
concur in referring to massive and organised violence against civilians as a common feature (Heyman 
1998, pp. 3-7), to which might be added that terror by definition (or, to be more precise, according to 
most definitions) is perpetrated by non-state actors. Not because states are innocent, but simply 
because the (usually much more massive) violence which they perpetrate, also against civilians, is 
normally called something else. I shall therefore proceed from the tentative definition of terrorism as  
“massive, organised violence perpetrated against civilians by non-state actors”. 
 
2.1 ODA and the terrorist threat to them 
According to the above definition, terror is quite widespread in the Third World, where most violent 
conflicts feature elements of terror. Indeed many of those conflicts which have been labeled “new 
wars” (Kaldor 1999), “uncivil wars” (Snow 1996) or “wars of the third kind” (Holsti 1996) are 
primarily waged against civilians. This sets them apart from “old” or “regular wars” which are 
primarily fought against the formal agents of the respective opponent, i.e. his regular troops, and 
where civilian casualties are therefore “collateral”, i.e. unintended (See Table 2).  
 Particularly extreme examples of rebel movements which have thus waged war against 
civilians include UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) in Angola (Brittain 
1998; Maier 1996) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone (Abdullah & Muana 
1998; Richards 1996) – both of which have now been defeated — and the Lord’s Restistance Army 
(LRA) in northern Uganda (Behrend 1998) which is continuing its atrocious struggle. Another 
example is the Interahamwe militia which played a major role in perpetrating the genocide in Rwanda 
in the spring of 1994 (Kakwenzire & Kamukaka 2000; Mamdani 2001, pp. 185-233), and the 
survivors of which have since wrecked havoc in the DR Congo as parties in the civil war (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2002, pp. 223-225; ICG 2000; ICG 2003a).  
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Table 2: The Development of War 
War Premodern Modern New/Neo-archaic 
Who? Mercenaries 
“Amateurs” 
Conscripts 
Professionals 
Militias 
Mercenaries 
Child soldiers 
Terrorists 
On whose 
behalf? 
Clan or tribe 
Feudal lords 
Warlords 
The State The Nation 
Ethnic or religious group  
Warlords 
Against whom? Soldiers Soldiers 
Civilians 
Civilians 
Why? Economic: booty  Political: Territory, sove-
reignty, power 
Individual or group 
interests 
Identity 
How? “Unorganised” Organised: Principles of 
war, Laws of war 
Guerilla war 
Terrorism 
 
Even though groups such as these undoubtedly deserve the label “terrorist”, one should be mindful to 
the fact that incumbent governments (who do not always differ much from rebels in their choice of 
methods) often pin the terrorist label on their opponents. So did, for instance, the apartheid regime in 
South Africa on the ANC—and not just on its armed forces, the Umkonto we Sizwe (MK), which had 
actually carried out bomb attacks and the like, but on the entire organisation (Whittaker, ed. 2001, pp. 
220-236). In the aftermath of the 11 September, moreover, Zimbabwe’s president Robert Mugabe in a 
blatant, albeit unsuccessful, attempt at courting the United States, did the same with regard to his 
political opponents in the Movement for Democratic Change, MDC (ICG 2002, pp. 4-5). Similar 
developments have been seen in the Arab states, as pointed out by the UN Development Programme in 
the 2003 version of its Arab Human Development Report: 
 
Following the bloody events of September 11 and the loss of innocent lives in violation of all man-made 
and divine laws, a number of countries have adopted extreme security measures and policies as part of the 
“war on terrorism”. These measures and policies, however, exceeded their original goals and led to the 
erosion of civil and political liberties in many countries in the world (…) One of the worst consequences 
of freedom-constraining measures in developed countries is that they gave authorities in some Arab 
countries another excuse to enact new laws limiting civil and political freedoms. (UNDP 2003, pp. 1-2). 
 
Even though it would thus be problematic to always accept at face value the incumbent government’s 
presentation of the problem, there may be good reasons to allocate aid resources to preventing and 
combating terrorism and terrorists such as those mentioned above. Almost the same considerations 
apply to terrorism as to security. 
 Certain forms of terrorism may threaten national (i.e. state) security, i.e. by being directed 
against the state or government as the “real” target, even though the immediate victims are civilians—
as when a rebel movement seeks to spread chaos in order to weaken the state with a view to 
subsequently taking over state power, as was the case of the NPLF (National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia) in Liberia in the first half of the nineties (Ellis 1999; Huband 1998). They actually succeded 
in bringing to power the former warlord Charles Taylor through a landslide victory in (more or less 
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democratic) elections, which seems to have reflected the fear among the electorate of a new period of  
state collapse and chaos, should he have lost at the ballot boxes (Alao & al. 1999, pp. 103-107).  
 For the prevention of this form of terrorism programmes for good governance, strengthening 
of democracy and the promotion of human rights recommend themselves as does support for (the non-
violent and non-terrorist parts of) civil society. For combating terrorism in cases of unsuccesful 
prevention, however, it may be most relevant to strengthen the state, which should preferably be 
combined  with power-sharing measures, allowing former rebel and terrorist leaders a say in political 
matters, e.g. by cooptation or even by offering them a seat in government, as happened with the 
former Renamo movement in Mozambique (Hume 1994; Synge 1997) and as it was attempted in the 
mid-nineties (and is presently being retried again) with UNITA in Angola (Hare 1998; ICG 2003b).  
 Other forms of terrorism are directed against societal security, i.e. against the identites of etnic 
or other groups. A particularly heinous form of terrorism (e.g. practiced in the former Yugoslavia) has 
been organised mass rape—not merely intended by the organisers to “please” their own troops, but 
also to “infect” the victims, not merely as individuals but also as those on whom the reproduction of 
the nation or ethnic group depends (Kaldor 1999, p. 52). A muslim woman who has been raped, 
perhaps even impregnated, by a Serbian soldier is no longer capable of transmitting the ethnic identity 
to her children, at least not according to more fundamentalist versions of Islam. 
 For the prevention of such forms of terrorism any measure is useful which may serve to erode 
ethnic or religious barriers, in which connection education is vital. Support for mass media dedicated 
to furthering mutual understanding among societal groups may likewise be valuable. Just as a hate 
radio such as the infamous Radio-Télevision Libre des Milles Collines in Rwanda could lay the 
groundworks for (and subsequently orchestrate and direct) a genocide of catastrophic proportions 
(Chalk 2000), radio stations such as Studio Jambo in Burundi (sponsored, among others, by the 
international NGO Search for Common Ground can presumably help preventing such disasters. Even 
trivial soap operas may promote this objective by depicting members of the opposing societal groups 
(in casu Hutus og Tutsis just as in Rwanda) as individuals rather than ethnic stereotypes. 
 Most forms of terrorism in the developing world as well as elsewhere, however, are directed 
against individuals, i.e. they represent an acute threat to human security in the sense of survival and 
quality of life, material as well as mental. Such terrorism is often motivated by personal hatreds (albeit 
often deliberately cultivated by unscrupulous leaders), which tend to affect mainly male youths who 
have been uprooted and marginalised as a result of economic developments (Richards 1996, pp. 87-
114)—or even children who in the role as child soldiers appear in disturbing numbers in many of 
especially Africa’s armed conflicts, and who are often even more brutalised and terroristically inclined 
than the adult rebels (Goodwin-Gill & Cohn 1994; Furley 1995). 
 Prevention of terrorism as a threat against human security is primarily a matter of promoting 
“soft” values and combating the “gun culture” which unfortunately reigns in many countries, not least 
in Africa (Cock 1997). This may happen through improved education as well as via support for civil 
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society. It will also be tremendously important to ensure that the young people (who statistically form 
a much larger share of the total population than in the developed world) have reasonable prospects for 
the future. Defeating this form of terrorism in the case of failed prevention will largely be a matter of 
strengthening and improving the police forces, not merely technically but also with regard to their 
ability to collaborate with civil society—and it thus makes perfect sense that Danida supports several 
such programmes in Africa.   
 In conclusion, there are thus good reasons for allocating ODA funds for terror prevention and 
counter-terrorism in developing countries, provided only that the overall objective of aid remains to 
help the recipients rather than the donors. Unfortunately, however, most of the current debate about 
terrorism and aid is devoted to the latter objective.  
 
2.2 ODA and the terrorist threat against us 
If is perfectly understandable that the threat of “Islamic terror” attracted much attention in the wake of 
the 11 September attacks. Nevertheless, this cannot justify sacrificing all sense of proportions. 
 A sobre analysis shows terrorism to be, at most, a minor problem in the developed world, 
where the risk of dying from terrorism is much lower than that of dying from, e.g., traffic accidents, 
smoking, unhealthy food or other “welfare phenomena”. In the United States the risk of violent death 
from ordinary crime or shootings has thus always been much higher than that of dying from terrorist 
attacks. Even in the annus horribilis of 2001, the number of homicides in the USA was (according to 
FBI statistics) 13,752 (of which 8,719 with handguns), which should be compared to what was at that 
time the official estimate of 2,823  World Trade Centre fatalities (FBI 2001, pp. 23 and 302). 
  
Fig. 2: International Terrorist Attacks 
(US State Department 2003, p. 161).
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One cannot even demonstrate that neither international terrorism or terrorism pure and simple are 
generally on the rise. On the contrary, the emerging picture from the last decades is one of ups and 
downs which do not really form a trend (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the changes from year to year 
have almost invariably been due to very specific causes such as breakthroughs or setbacks in the 
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Middle Eastern peace process or improvements or deteriorations in relations beteen India and 
Pakistan.  
 Moreover, terrorism has typically not hit the global “North” and not at all blindly (see Table 
3). On the contrary it has been concentrated in other continents and usually been accurately targeted, 
simply because it has mostly been motivated by concrete political goals. Targets have included Israel 
(because of the Palestine conflict), the UK (because of Northern Ireland), Spain (due to the Basque 
conflict), India (related to the Kashmir conflict), Russia (because of Chechnya), etc.. Most other 
countries, including Denmark have hardly experienced any terrorist attacks at all, even though some of 
their citizens may have been hit inadvertently, simply because they happened to be in the wrong place 
at the wrong time. 
 What may be new and a reason for concern is the size of terrorist attacks (see Table 3) as well 
as the motivation for some of the largest ones, even though it is too early to tell whether there are 
isolæated incidents or harbingers of an emergent trend. 
 
Table 3: International Terrorism (US State Department 2003, pp. 162-163) 
Attacks 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Ialt Ann. Average
Africa 11 21 53 55 33 5 178 29.7
Asia 21 49 72 99 68 99 408 68.0
Eurasia 42 14 35 31 3 7 132 22.0
Latin America 128 111 122 192 201 50 804 134.0
Middle East 37 31 26 20 29 29 172 28.7
North America 13 0 2 0 4 0 19 3.2
Western Europe 52 48 85 30 17 9 241 40.2
Total 304 274 395 427 355 199 1,954 325.7
Victims 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Ialt Ann. Average
Africa 28 5,379 185 102 150 12 5,856 976.0
Asia 344 635 690 904 651 1,281 4,505 750.8
Eurasia 27 12 8 103 0 615 765 127.5
Latin America 11 195 10 20 6 52 294 49.0
Middle East 480 68 31 78 513 772 1,942 323.7
North America 7 0 0 0 4,091 0 4,098 683.0
Western Europe 17 405 16 4 20 6 468 78.0
Total 914 6,694 940 1,211 5,431 2,738 17,928 2,988.0
Victims per attack (average) 3.0 24.4 2.4 2.8 15.3 13.8 9.2 -
 
Whereas most previous terrorist attacks had relatively well defined and limited political goals, groups 
such as the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikio, responsible for the poison gas attack in the Tokyo metro in 
1995 (Kaplan 2000; Juergensmeyer 2000, pp. 102-116) and the al-Qaeda network (Williams 2002) 
have apparently no real political goals. As shown by Mark Juergensmeyer (2000, pp. 119-243; cf. 
Laqueur 1999, pp. 127-155) they rather see themselves as engaged in a “cosmic war” between nothing 
less than Good and Evil. This may justify absolute ends and objectives and the resort to unlimited 
means to achieve them, perhaps even weapons of mass destruction (Tucker, ed. 2000; Laqueur 1999; 
Gurr & Cole 2000) such as nuclear weapons or biological weapons designed to cause infectuous and 
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deadly diseases. In view of prospects such as these it stands to reason that international terrorism can 
only be trivialised at one’s own peril. Acknowledging it as a serious problem, however, raises two 
questions, i.e. how to prevent or defeat it and whether development aid may be instrumentalised for 
this purpose. 
 As a minimum, donor countries such as Denmark may obviously demand from prospective 
recipients of ODA, be they countries or organisations, that they refrain from engaging in or supporting 
terror directed against ourselves or our allies. Nobody is neither legally nor morally obliged to provide 
weapons or other support to one’s direct enemies. Applying this minimum criterion is rather 
unproblematic for a country such as Denmark, as by far the largest part of our ODA is anyhow granted 
to countries where international terrorism represents no problem. Problems may, however, arise with 
regard to reconstruction assistance to organisations in countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq where it 
may be difficult to ensure that these recipients do not clandestinely support international terrorism (or 
begin to do so at a later stage)—a complication which may also arise with regard to aid to the 
Palestinian authorities. 
 Regardless of how reasonable such minimum demands may be, there is no reason to expect 
their application to have any major effect in terms of preventing or combatting international terrorism, 
thereby improving our (national, societal or human) security. Indeed, it may even have the opposite 
effect. If we were to chose to support the most fanatical and extreme terrorist organisations, we might 
actually achive such an improvement in the sense of moving down several places on their list of future 
targets. Needless to say, however, thus paying terrorists “protection money” in the form of ODA 
would be totally unjustifiable, both politically and morally. 
 As correctly formulated in the Danish government’s strategy plan for ODA in the coming 
five-year period, A World of Difference, the main contribution of development aid to the fight against 
terrorism is of a more general nature, i.e. to “fight the underdevelopment and the hopelessness that 
create an ideal breeding ground for religious fundamentalism and political radicalisation.” It therefore 
also appears sensible that “the Government will significantly enhance efforts to prevent the outbreak 
of conflicts and to stabilise and consolidate peace, both bilaterally and multilaterally”. (MFA 2003, pp. 
2 and 8). Unfortunately, however, this is much easier said than done, as the connections are quite 
complex and may differ from country to country. 
 The first dilemma to address is how to weigh considerations of terror prevention and counter-
terrorism against those of poverty alleviation and other traditional ODA objectives. There does not 
seem to be any clear link between poverty and terrorism (Midlarsky 1999, pp. 231-247), neither in the 
sense that terrorists are usually poor nor that they tend to come from poor countries. On the contrary, 
the typical terrorist comes from the urban middle class, but has often been (and almost always feels) 
marginalised (Bell 1998, s. 74-102; Laqueur s. 90-97; Sullivan 2001). If he (almost all terrorists are 
men) were to be made eligible for aid, this would almost inevitably be at the expense of the poor, the 
rural population and women who have traditionally  (and rightly so) been the preferred recipients. 
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 Furthermore, the typical recrouting countries for terrorists do not belong to the world’s 
poorest. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia was the country of  origin of most of the perpetrators of the 11 
September attacks—but to grant development assistance to a country with an annual per capita income 
of more than 10,000 US dollars (UNDP s. 165) would be obviously absurd. The poorest countries of 
the world are, on the other hand, not the typical breeding grounds for terrorism, even though certain 
very poor countries may serve as convenient bases of operation for terrorist organisations or networks. 
Even in such cases, however, this is not so much because of poverty as such, but a result of these 
countries having weak or even collapsed state structures, as was obviously the case in Afghanistan 
(Rubin 1995; Kaplan 2001; Mishra 2002a; 2002b) and as may in the future be the case of e.g. Somalia 
(Kansteiner 2002). To prevent this from happening probably requires a reconstruction of the collapsed 
states almost from scratch, both economically, politically, administratively and politically—for which 
purposes the granting of ODA funds would seem obvious. 
 Perhaps equally important is the psychological factor. Both the typical terrorists and their 
supporters and “constituencies” (as well as a very large part of the general population, perhaps even 
the majority) feel that they are being treated unfairly and perceive their identity as being threatened by 
the “MacWorld” of globalisation which may explain their resort to “Jihad”, as aptly formulated in 
Samuel Barber’s bestseller (2001. See also Robertson 1992). Furthermore, according to some analysts 
(Mousseau 2002) the population in many developing countries feels that their “clientilistic” culture, 
resting on lasting personal bonds, is being pushed aside by the market culture featuring less solid and 
short-term contractual relations. This is not perceived as a clash of cultures or civilisations in the sense 
of Samuel Huntington (1996), but rather as a struggle for the survival of their culture in an uneven 
struggle against our lack of culture. In such a situation even terrorism may appear as legitimate–but 
development aid granted without hidden selfish motives or demeaning and humiliating conditionalities 
may help prevent the spread of such attitudes. 
 
3 CONCLUSION  
There thus seems to be some sense in allowing terror prevention and counter-terrorism as well as more 
generel security political consideration to play a certain role alongside other rationales for granting 
ODA. Primarily it makes sense to strengthen the security of the recipients of aid, also against 
terrorism, as this is a precondition for meeting the other objectives of development aid. Secondarily, 
certain forms of development aid may also contribute modestly to our security, partly as means of 
terror prevention. However, it would be unwise to expect swift or dramatic results of this, and as 
argued above it will be of the utmost importance to avoid a patronising posture in the allocation of aid 
to countries and projects, as this risks exacerbating the problem by reinforcing the impression of an 
uneven struggle between culture and power. 
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